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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970462-CA 
v. 
MICHAEL JAMES FISK, III, : Priority No. 10 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the magistrate's interlocutory order 
denying his motion to dismiss one count of child abuse, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) 
(1995) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3 (2) (d) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the State's proffer of new evidence and the 
magistrate's finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith when 
she failed to present that evidence at the original preliminary 
hearing satisfy the State v. Brickey requirements for refiling 
the charge previously dismissed for insufficient evidence? 
Defendant's claim raises an issue of the proper legal 
interpretation of the Brickey rule. Therefore, the issue is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
2. Is defendant's appellate argument that the magistrate 
1 
clearly erred by finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith 
properly before this Court when defendant did not make that 
argument to the magistrate? 
Defendant's appellate argument is not properly before the 
Court because he did not present it to the lower court. See 
State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 
(1995) ; rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; and rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information filed in March 1995, the State, through the 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, charged defendant and his 
wife, Melissa Fisk, with one count each of second-degree felony 
child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a) 
(1995) (R. 13-14, 139). At the conclusion of the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate refused to bind defendant and his wife 
over for trial (R. 14; Tr. July 18, 1995 at 113). The magistrate 
found that the State had established probable cause to believe 
that the two-year-old victim, D.S., had suffered non-accidental 
injuries, but had not established probable cause to believe that 
either defendant or his wife inflicted those injuries (id.). 
By information dated January 29, 1997, the State, through 
the Utah Attorney Generalfs Office, recharged defendant with 
child abuse (R. 8). Defendant moved to dismiss the information, 
contending that State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) barred 
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recharging him with child abuse (R. 99) . The magistrate denied 
his motion (R. 361). l 
This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory 
review of that order (R. 374). There has been no preliminary 
hearing on the refiled charge; the only issue on this appeal is 
whether the magistrate properly denied the motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State has charged defendant with shaking two-year-old 
D.S. so severely that the resulting brain damage has left D.S. in 
a vegetative state. 
Introduction 
D.S.fs mother and defendant's wife, Melissa Fisk, have known 
each other since they were teenagers (R. 124; Juv. Ct. Hearing at 
141) .2 According to Ms. Fisk, D.S.'s mother had difficulty 
2The January 29, 1997 information recharged both defendant 
and his wife (R. 8). The State charged defendant with two counts 
of second-degree felony child abuse, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1995), and one count of class A 
misdemeanor child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(3) (a) (1995) (R. 9-10). The State charged Ms. Fisk with one 
count of second-degree felony child abuse, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1995), and one count of class A 
misdemeanor child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(3)(a) (1995) (R. 10-11). 
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss the information (R. 
99, 191). The magistrate granted Ms. Fisk's motion (R. 361). 
The magistrate also dismissed two of the counts charged against 
defendant (id.). The magistrate allowed the State to proceed 
against defendant on one count only (id.). 
2Portions of the juvenile court proceedings have been 
included in the record as exhibits to Ms. Fisk's motion to 
dismiss. However, those pages do not have separate record 
numbers. The State will refer to those pages as "Juv Ct 
Hearing." The transcript pages are in volume 2 of the pleadings 
files. 
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caring for D.S. and his two older siblings (Juv. Ct. Hearing 141-
42). Consequently, in October and November 1994, defendant and 
his wife began taking D.S. and his two siblings to stay with them 
and their three children for two to three day periods (juv. ct. 
hearing 146). 
In early December 1994, D.S. and his siblings moved in with 
defendant and his family (id. at 55). On February 1, 1995, 
defendant and his wife undertook legal guardianship of D.S. and 
his two siblings (id.). 
Ms. Fisk began reporting problems with D.S. in early March 
1995. She reported to various health care professionals that 
D.S. head-banged, exhibited seizure-like activity where he would 
fall to the floor, screamed, and forced himself to lose 
consciousness (Juv. Ct. Hearing at 60-68, 92, 97, 99, 106-107, 
110-11, 114, 140, 156-57, 166). 
Facts available prior to the 1995 preliminary hearing. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 19, 1995, defendant and 
his wife brought D.S. to the Primary Children's Medical Center 
emergency room in cardiorespiratory arrest; doctors successfully 
resuscitated him (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 11). A CT scan revealed 
bleeding over the surface of D.S.!s brain and substantial retinal 
bleeding (id. at 25, 27-28). D.S.'s brain swelled so much that 
the swelling separated the sutures in his skull (id. at 25-26) . 
These injuries indicated that D.S. had suffered a violent shaking 
within the last week (id. at 35-36, 57-58). 
D.S. had additional injuries of varying ages. D.S. had 
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other retinal hemorrhages that appeared older than the fresh 
hemorrhages observed on March 19th (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 66) . 
D.S. had linear bruises of different ages spanning his forehead 
(Tr. July 18, 1995 at 15-16, 39). These bruises resulted from 
having his head forcefully pressed against a linear grid and not 
from head-banging (id. at 16). 
D.S. had a pinching bruise on both the inside and outside of 
his left ear lobe (id. at 17). The bruise could not have 
resulted from a blow, unless D.S. had received a blow on the 
outside of the earlobe, then a blow in the same place with the 
ear folded over (id. at 62). 
D.S. had several bruises of varying ages indicating that he 
had been grabbed forcefully. Those included bruises on his right 
forearm, a bruise above the right elbow, three circular bruises 
on his right leg, circular bruises on his left and right elbows, 
and circular bruises on the lateral aspect of his left knee (id. 
at 18-24, 62-64) . 
D.S. had bruises over the bony prominences of back caused by 
having his back pushed against a hard surface (id. at 20). 
A CT scan of D.S.fs abdomen revealed calcified tissue in 
front of the vertebrae (id. at 26-27). The calcified tissue was 
scarring from a prior severe extension or compression of the 
spine, as in shaking D.S. or folding his body, which causes the 
tissue to tear and bleed (R. 27, 36-37) . 
Finally, D.S. appeared unusually small for a two-year-old 
(id. at 24). 
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The record contains three reports of interviews with 
defendant and Ms. Fisk conducted after they brought D.S. to the 
emergency room. In those reports, both defendant and Ms. Fisk 
agreed that Ms. Fisk fed D.S. oatmeal sometime in the afternoon 
before they brought D.S. to the hospital March 19th (R. 124, 126, 
131). However, they gave varying accounts about what happened 
after D.S. finished eating the oatmeal. They reported to a 
social worker that, after Ms. Fisk fed D.S., D.S. began throwing 
himself down, so defendant put D.S. in another room and 
periodically checked on D.S. (R. 125). On one of these checks, 
defendant discovered that D.S. had stopped breathing (id.) 
Defendant reported to an investigating officer that Ms. Fisk 
was feeding D.S. oatmeal in the bedroom when D.S. began throwing 
up and screaming (R. 127). Defendant claimed that he took D.S. 
out of his high chair and put D.S. on his side so that he would 
not aspirate the vomit (id.). Defendant was observing D.S.'s 
breathing when D.S. stopped breathing (id.). The report does not 
state that defendant was alone in the room with D.S. when D.S. 
stopped breathing. 
Ms. Fisk reported to one of the investigating officers that, 
after D.S. finished eating, he screamed and passed out (R. 131). 
D.S. came to, fell over once, then made himself pass out again 
(id.). According to Ms. Fisk, she told defendant to watch D.S., 
then left the room (R. 131, 137-38). The next thing she knew, 
defendant came out of the room with D.S. and told her to get the 
keys so that they could take D.S. to the hospital (R. 137). She 
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did not specify how much time passed between the time she left 
the room and when defendant brought D.S. out. 
At the 1995 preliminary hearing, the State relied on D.S.'s 
old and new injuries to support its child abuse charges against 
defendant and Ms. Fisk. A medical expert testified about the 
approximate age of the injuries, and that they could not have 
resulted from accidental trauma (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 20-22, 26-
28, 38-40, 57-58, 66-67). However, she could testify only that 
the newer injuries occurred within one week prior to March 19th, 
and the older ones occurred more than one week before that date 
(id, at 20-22, 26, 57-58). Most importantly, she testified only 
that the massive brain injury that doctors observed on March 19, 
1995, could not be more than one week old (id. at 26) . 
An investigating officer testified that defendant reported 
that only he and Ms. Fisk cared for the children (id. at 105). 
The officer testified that she "assumed" that defendant and Ms. 
Fisk were D.S.!s primary caregivers (id. at 105-106). However, 
she could not testify about the number of hours during the day 
defendant was home with the children, and she acknowledged that 
she asked no questions on that subject (id. at 106-107) . 
The magistrate found the evidence sufficient to establish 
probable cause to believe that D.S.fs injuries were intentionally 
inflicted rather than accidentally inflicted (id. at 113). 
However, the magistrate found that the evidence failed to 
establish that either defendant or his wife caused those injuries 
(id.). Consequently, the magistrate dismissed the information at 
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the conclusion of the July 18, 1995 preliminary hearing. 
Facts available after the 1995 preliminary hearing. 
Approximately four months after the 1995 preliminary hearing 
dismissal, during November 1995 juvenile court proceedings, Ms. 
Fisk gave her first sworn testimony about the events of March 19, 
1995 (Juv. Ct. Hearing at 54).3 For the first time, she included 
a detailed chronology of the critical period before she and 
defendant took D.S. to the hospital. Ms. Fisk testified that she 
began feeding D.S. in the bedroom at approximately 3:15 p.m. 
while defendant sat in the room (id. at 72-74). She finished 
feeding D.S. by 3:30 p.m. (id. at 73). After she finished, she 
began brushing D.S.fs teeth when D.S. screamed until he passed 
out (id. at 74). She took D.S. out of the high chair, put him on 
the floor, then left him in the room with defendant (id.). 
Approximately thirty minutes later, defendant brought D.S. out of 
the bedroom in cardiac arrest; he and Ms. Fisk took D.S. to the 
emergency room (id. at 75-77). This is the first evidence in the 
record establishing the thirty-minute period during which 
defendant had exclusive control over D.S. 
Also sometime after the 1995 preliminary hearing, the Salt 
Lake District Attorney's office turned the case over to the Utah 
Attorney General's Child Abuse Unit.4 The attorney general's 
defendant also testified; however, defendant has not 
included his juvenile court testimony in this record (Juv. Ct. 
Hearing at 195) 
4The record does not clearly establish when the Utah 
Attorney General's office received the case. 
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office developed evidence in addition to that obtained at the 
juvenile court proceedings. Most importantly, the attorney 
general's office obtained an expert opinion from Dr. Marion 
Walker, a neurosurgeon at Primary Children's Medical Center (R. 
116). Dr. Walker's May 1, 1997 opinion letter is attached as 
addendum B. Dr. Walker noted that a CT scan performed on March 
3, 1995 showed no evidence of brain damage (id.). However, at 
the time of his March 19th admission, D.S. had fresh bleeding 
over the surface of the brain and retinal hemorrhages in the eye 
grounds (id.). Dr. Walker opined that D.S. could not have 
sustained this massive brain injury at the time Ms. Fisk claimed 
that D.S. was awake, alert, eating, and fussing (id.). The 
injury must have occurred sometime between that time and when 
defendant came out of the bedroom with D.S. in cardiorespiratory 
arrest (id.).5 
Dr. Walker concluded that only a shaking and bashing could 
have caused these injuries (R. 117). He elaborated that even a 
prior head trauma could not explain the magnitude of the injury 
to D.S.'s brain (R. 116). 
On the strength of Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony and Dr. 
Walker's expert opinion, the State refiled child abuse charges 
against defendant for the March 19, 1995 shaking (R. 8). In 
response to defendant's Brickey motion, the State proffered this 
additional evidence to the same magistrate who had previously 
5A follow-up MRI study performed November 1995 showed a 
substantial loss of brain matter caused by the March 19th injury 
(id*). 
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dismissed the child abuse charge for insufficient evidence (R. 
264-65). The State contended that this evidence now established 
that defendant had exclusive control over D.S. when D.S. suffered 
the shaking that destroyed his brain (R. 266-68) . 
The magistrate stated that the case could have been bound 
over if the State had presented this additional evidence at the 
1995 preliminary hearing (R. 315, 360). The magistrate further 
found that the State could have discovered the additional 
evidence prior to the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 359-361). 
However, he also found that the State acted in good faith in 
presenting its case at the 1995 preliminary hearing, and that Dr. 
Walker's testimony "may11 be "new evidence" within the meaning of 
Brickev (R. 315, 360-61) . Consequently, the magistrate ruled 
that the State could proceed against defendant on the child abuse 
charge for the March 19, 1995 shaking (R. 361). Copies of the 
magistrate's oral ruling (R. 315) and his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are attached as addenda C and D respectively. 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Magistrate's Brickey ruling. The magistrate correctly 
interpreted the "other good cause" requirement in State v. 
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), to include the original 
prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the necessary evidence 
to establish probable cause. First, dicta in Brickey clearly 
anticipates that such an underestimation amounts to "good cause" 
as the supreme court used that phrase. 
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Second, the magistrate's interpretation furthers the 
purposes of Brickey without permitting defendant to escape 
prosecution for a well-grounded claim. Brickev merely protects a 
defendant against State abuses such as refiling groundless claims 
in the hope that some magistrate will eventually bind a defendant 
over for trial, or presenting a minimal case at the preliminary 
hearing with the purpose of inappropriately hiding evidence from 
a defendant. However, when a prosecutor fails to discover or 
present evidence because she has underestimated the evidence 
necessary to establish probable cause, the abuses against which 
Brickey protects are not implicated. 
Moreover, the magistrate correctly interpreted the "new 
evidence" requirement in Brickey to include the additional 
evidence that the State proffered in this case. The most logical 
definition of "new evidence" as Brickey uses that phrase is 
evidence not presented at a prior preliminary hearing that the 
State did not hold back in order to deceive defendant about its 
existence. The additional evidence proffered in this case meets 
that criteria. 
2. Magistrate's finding of good faith. For the first time 
on appeal, defendant contends that there is no basis in the 
evidence to support the magistrate's finding that the prosecutor 
acted in good faith. Defendant waived this argument because he 
failed to present it to the magistrate. 
Alternatively, the record contains sufficient evidence to 
support that finding. Therefore, the magistrate did not clearly 
11 
err in making it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO RECHARGE 
DEFENDANT FOR CAUSING D.S.'S MASSIVE BRAIN INJURIES 
BECAUSE THE STATE INNOCENTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE PROOF 
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE 1995 
PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND BECAUSE THE STATE PROFFERED 
NEW EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THAT DEFENDANT CAUSED THOSE INJURIES 
A preliminary hearing magistrate must dismiss an information 
and discharge a defendant if the State!s evidence fails to 
establish probable cause to believe that a defendant committed 
the charged crime. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, "[t]he 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the State from 
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense." Id. 
Although the rule's plain language places no restrictions on 
the State's ability to refile a dismissed charge, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that state due process does. In State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that, 
after a magistrate has dismissed a charge for insufficient 
evidence, state due process precludes refiling the same charge 
unless the State shows that it has new or previously unavailable 
evidence, or that other good cause exists for refiling. Id. at 
647. 
In this case, the State proffered the following evidence in 
addition to that presented at the 1995 preliminary hearing: 1) 
Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony that finally detailed the events that 
occurred between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on March 19, 1995; and 
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2) Dr. Walker's opinion that D.S. could not have been alert, 
eating, and fussing at 3:00 p.m. if he had already been shaken 
(R. 116, 264-66, Juv. Ct. Hearing at 72-77) . Based on that 
evidence, the State contended that it could now establish that 
defendant had exclusive control over D.S. at the time that D.S. 
suffered the shaking that destroyed his brain (R. 266-68). 
The same magistrate who previously refused to bind defendant 
over at the conclusion of the 1995 preliminary hearing permitted 
the State to proceed on the new child abuse charge. The 
magistrate found that the State could have discovered evidence 
establishing defendant's exclusive control over D.S. when D.S. 
was shaken and that the evidence would have resulted in a 
bindover at the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 360-61). However, 
the magistrate found that the State acted in good faith in its 
presentation at the 1995 preliminary hearing and without any 
intent to deceive either the court or defendant (R. 360-61). The 
magistrate also concluded that Dr. Walker's testimony "may" 
amount to new evidence (R. 3 61). 
Defendant contends that acting in good faith cannot, as a 
matter of law, satisfy the Brickey "good cause" prerequisite to 
refiling a previously dismissed charge. Appellant's Brief at 9-
11. Defendant also contends that the magistrate incorrectly 
interpreted "new evidence" to include Dr. Walker's opinion 
testimony. Appellant's Brief at 5 n.3. 
Normally, the appellate courts review a lower court's good 
cause determination for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g. State 
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v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App 1992) (trial court's 
determination whether good cause exists for withdrawing guilty 
plea reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993); State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 
1987) (indigent defendant must show good cause for appointment of 
substitute counsel; decision whether to appoint substitute 
counsel review for abuse of discretion). However, this case does 
not raise issues about whether the specific facts of this case 
satisfy the legal standards articulated in Brickey. Rather, 
defendant challenges only the magistrate's legal interpretations 
of "other good cause" and "new evidence." Therefore, defendant's 
claim presents a legal question reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) ("legal 
determinations" are rules applied uniformly to similarly situated 
persons and are reviewed for correctness). 
The magistrate correctly interpreted "other good cause" and 
"new evidence," as Brickey uses those phrases, and properly ruled 
that "other good cause" and "new evidence" justified refiling the 
child abuse charge against defendant. Brickey admittedly 
provides little detail on the meanings of "new evidence," 
"previously unavailable evidence," or "other good cause." 
Similarly, no additional cases from either the supreme court or 
this Court have clarified the circumstances that satisfy the 
Brickey restrictions. 
Brickey does state in dicta, however, that "other good 
cause" can mean an innocent miscalculation of the necessary 
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quantum of evidence to obtain a bindover. Id. at 647-48 n. 5. 
That dicta applies to this case. In the context of Brickey, this 
dicta specifically refers to a prosecutor who has additional 
evidence, but does not present it because she has miscalculated 
how much evidence is necessary to establish probable cause. The 
Brickey court cited to Harper which referred to a prosecutor's 
innocent decision not to put on some of its evidence: 
It was not intended, nor is it expected, in order 
to show probable cause, that in all cases the 
prosecution must present its entire case before the 
examining magistrate. That is a decision to be reached 
by the district attorney . . . in the event the 
prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present 
sufficient evidence to show probable cause to bind over 
the accused, but possesses other witnesses whose 
testimony would strengthen his showing, it is clearly 
within the discretion of the examining magistrate to 
grant the state a continuance for that purpose. 
Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the original prosecutor's insufficient 
investigation led to the dismissal of the first information. The 
magistrate found that the original prosecutor could have 
discovered the evidence that established that defendant shook 
D.S. through the exercise of ordinary diligence, and that that 
evidence would have resulted in a bindover at the conclusion of 
the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 359-60). However, the 
magistrate also found that the prosecutor's "failure to discover 
the evidence and the failure to present more compelling evidence 
regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of control 
over the victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good 
faith" (id.) (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the 
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innocent miscalculation results from insufficient investigation 
or failure to produce evidence that the prosecutor has already-
obtained, it is the prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the 
critical evidence necessary to establish probable cause that 
creates the "good cause" anticipated by the Brickey and Harper 
dicta. 
There is no substantive difference between the Brickey dicta 
and prosecutor's good faith actions in this case. Consequently, 
the magistrate correctly ruled that "other good cause" within the 
meaning of Brickey includes the prosecutor's innocent 
underestimation of the necessary evidence to bindover a 
defendant, and that "good cause" for refiling the charges existed 
in this case (R. 360-61). State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5 
(dicta) (innocent miscalculation establishes other good cause 
justifying a continuance) (citing Harper v. District Court, 484 
P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (dicta)); State v. Rivera, 
871 P.2d 1023, 1026 n.4 (Utah App. 1994) (dicta) (an innocent 
miscalculation of the necessary quantum of evidence justifies 
refiling), rev'd on other grounds, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995). 
Moreover, the circumstances in Brickey and the basis for the 
supreme court's decision also establish that the magistrate 
correctly interpreted "other good cause" to include an innocent 
underestimation of the evidence necessary to establish probable 
cause. The supreme court began its analysis in Brickey by 
restating the purpose of a preliminary hearing: to ferret out 
groundless and improvident prosecutions. Id. at 646. The court 
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noted the importance of this function to protect a defendant from 
the degradation and expense of trial, to conserve judicial 
resources, and to promote confidence in the judicial system. The 
supreme court further reasoned that granting the State unlimited 
discretion in determining whether to refile charges raised the 
intolerable specter of the State harassing a defendant who had 
previously had the charges dismissed for insufficient evidence. 
Id. at 646-47. Moreover, the dicta interpreting "good cause" to 
include an innocent miscalculation of the necessary evidence to 
establish probable cause negatively infers that the State cannot 
purposefully hold back crucial evidence in an effort to ambush a 
defendant with it at trial. Id. at 647 n.5.6 
This reasoning, taken as a whole, establishes that the 
supreme court fashioned the Brickey rule to protect against two 
potential abuses: 1) the State harassing a defendant by 
continually refiling groundless claims; and 2) the State 
purposefully withholding critical evidence in order to improperly 
impair a defendant's pre-trial discovery rights. 
6Defendant attempts to distinguish the Brickey dicta by 
contending that it permits only a continuance, not a refiling. 
Appellant's Brief at 8-9. His analysis ignores this Court's 
recognition in Rivera that the innocent miscalculation also 
justifies refiling. It also ignores the context of the dicta. 
As established in the text, the dicta specifically refers to a 
prosecutor's innocent failure to produce some of the evidence 
that it already has. In that circumstance, a continuance 
provides a sufficient remedy. However, when the State has 
innocently failed to discover or develop the evidence necessary 
for a bindover, refiling provides the only sufficient remedy. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, the "other good cause" 
anticipated by those cases is the innocent miscalculation, not 
the remedy for it. 
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When considered in light of these policy considerations, the 
magistrate correctly interpreted "other good cause" to include 
the prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the evidence 
necessary to establish probable cause. Defendant does not face 
harassment by the second filing of a groundless claim. To the 
contrary, the magistrate found that it would have bound the case 
over if the State had presented the additional evidence at the 
1995 preliminary hearing (R. 360). Unlike the prosecutor in 
Brickey, the State did not present the same evidence to a 
different magistrate to obtain a bindover; it presented 
additional evidence to the same magistrate to establish that the 
claim was not groundless.7 
Similarly, the magistrate found that the prosecutor did not 
act maliciously, in bad faith, or with intent to deceive either 
defendant or the court, and defendant does not contend to the 
contrary. This case does not present the problem of a prosecutor 
trying to improperly hide evidence from defendant. Because a 
7The magistrate also acknowledged that, based on this 
evidence, it appeared that defendant had committed a very serious 
crime (R. 315). Defendant complains that "the fact that this 
statement was made is unsettling at the least, and perhaps 
indicative of extraneous considerations influencing the District 
Court's deliberative process at worst." Appellant's Brief at 13 
n.5. Defendant fails to explain how this consideration is 
extraneous. To the contrary, given the purpose of ferreting out 
groundless claims, it seems that the magistrate's belief that the 
claim is well-grounded was important to its Brickey analysis. 
Additionally, the magistrate gave defendant the option to 
have a different magistrate preside at the second preliminary 
hearing (R. 362) . Defendant has exercised that option (R. 366) . 
Therefore, the comment raises no concerns about this magistrate's 
ability to make an impartial probable cause determination at any 
subsequent preliminary hearing. 
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good faith underestimation of the evidence does not implicate the 
abuses against which Brickey protects, the magistrate correctly 
concluded that it constitutes "other good cause" within the 
meaning of Brickey. 
Other cases also support the magistrate's ruling. For 
example, in Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1973), the prosecutor charged Chase with escape. Id. at 1143. 
At the initial preliminary hearing, a records officer from the 
penitentiary testified that Chase was being held for 
"safekeeping" rather than on a judgment. Id. Consequently, the 
magistrate dismissed the case. Id. Subsequently, the State 
discovered that the records officer had made a mistake, and that 
Chase was being held on a valid judgment. Id. In Chase, as in 
this case, the prosecutor technically had available to it 
evidence that would have justified binding Chase over at the 
original preliminary hearing. However, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that the state could proceed with the 
second prosecution on the basis of the corrected evidence. Id. 
at 1143-44. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals has gone so far as to permit 
refilings based on prosecutorial neglect or ineptitude. In 
People v. Laslo, 259 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. App. 1977), the prosecutor 
failed at two preliminary hearings to produce witnesses with 
evidence critical to the probable cause determination. Id. at 
450-51. The Michigan court rejected Laslofs argument that it 
violated due process to permit the third preliminary hearing and 
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resulting bindover. The Michigan court reasoned that the 
prosecutor had not engaged in forum shopping and had not failed 
to produce additional evidence at the final, successful 
preliminary hearing. Id. at 451. Rather, the court found that 
the prior failures resulted from nothing more than prosecutorial 
11
 ineptness . " Id. 
Moreover, to support its holding, the Michigan court relied 
on Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971): the same 
case on which the Brickey court relied to limit the Statefs right 
to refile charges. Therefore, the Michigan court has interpreted 
the same rule on which the Brickey court relied to permit 
refilings when the first dismissal resulted from a prosecutor's 
mistake. See State v. Varcro, 362 N.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Mich. App. 
1984) (no due process bar where prosecutor presented evidence 
that he did not, but could have presented at first preliminary 
hearing where failure to present it resulted from neglect rather 
than deliberate attempt to harass defendant). See also State v. 
Bacon, 791 P.2d 429, 434-35 (Idaho 1990) (barring the State from 
refiling requires an affirmative showing of bad faith). 
Conversely, defendant cites no case, and the State is aware 
of none, where a court has rejected a refiling based on an 
innocent underestimation of the evidence. Furthermore, the cases 
holding that a prosecutor could not refile charges involve clear 
prosecutorial abuses. The prosecutors in Brickey and Jones 
clearly engaged in forum-shopping by presenting the same evidence 
at the subsequent preliminary hearings before different 
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magistrates. State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646-48; Jones v. 
State, 481 P.2d at 171-72. See also People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d 
136, 137-39 (Mich. App. 1982) (State improperly filed new 
complaint and proceeded before new magistrate based on hearsay 
evidence ruled inadmissible by first magistrate). The magistrate 
found that no such abuse occurred in this case. 
Nevertheless, defendant argues that "other good cause" 
cannot mean a prosecutor's good faith underestimation of the 
evidence. Appellant's Brief at 6-11. According to defendant, 
"other good cause" exists only when the State produces additional 
evidence that it could not have discovered at the time of the 
preliminary hearing through the exercise of ordinary diligence. 
Brickey1s plain language contradicts defendant's contention 
that "other good cause" can only mean the discovery of previously 
undiscoverable evidence. Brickey explicitly permits refiling 
charges for "other good cause" as an alternative to permitting 
refiling based on the introduction of new or previously 
unavailable evidence; it does not define "other good cause" to 
mean only the reliance on new or previously unavailable evidence. 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. 
More importantly, defendant's interpretation that "good 
cause" can mean only the discovery of previously undiscoverable 
evidence divorces Brickey from its intended purpose. Defendant 
asks for an interpretation of the Brickey rule that seeks no 
protection against prosecutorial abuse, and defendant had 
identified no abuse in this case. Instead, defendant seeks to 
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use Brickey as a sword to obtain a windfall because he had the 
good fortune to have his case assigned to a prosecutor who, in 
good faith, underestimated the evidence necessary to obtain a 
bindover. Contrary to the purpose of the Brickey rule, 
defendant's interpretation would undermine confidence in the 
judicial system by allowing him to rely on a technicality to 
escape prosecution on a charge for which the State has now 
developed solid evidence. See State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 
(identifying the promotion of confidence in the judicial system 
as one of reasons a preliminary hearing ferrets out groundless 
prosecutions).8 
The magistrate also correctly concluded that the State's 
additional evidence proffered in support of the new charge 
constitutes "new evidence" within the meaning of Brickey.9 
Defendant also argues that the supreme court rejected 
relying on the prosecutors' good faith to protect a defendant's 
due process rights. Appellant's Brief at 10-11 citing State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. To the extent defendant implies that 
Brickey has already rejected relying on a prosecutor's good faith 
underestimation of the evidence, that implication misstates 
Brickey. The cited portion of Brickey only rejected the State's 
argument that a prosecutor's good faith exercise of her 
unfettered discretion in refiling provided sufficient protection 
for an accused. The supreme court did not hold that the 
prosecutor's good faith underestimation in presenting the case at 
a preliminary hearing would not constitute good cause for 
refiling the same charges. 
9The magistrate ruled the Dr. Walker's testimony "may" 
constitute "new evidence" (R. 361). The magistrate did not 
expressly rule whether the Ms. Fisk's sworn juvenile court 
testimony detailing the events of the 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 
period constituted new evidence; however, that is the most 
logical inference from the magistrate's rulings. The magistrate 
found that the State was proffering evidence that established 
with more precision the timing of D.S.'s injuries and exclusivity 
of defendant's control; evidence that would have resulted in a 
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Defendant argued below that the "new evidence" standard 
applicable to obtaining a new trial should define what 
constitutes "new evidence" under Brickey (R. 306-307). Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59(a) (4). That standard would require the State to prove 
that the prosecutor could not have discovered the additional 
evidence proffered to support recharging defendant through the 
exercise of ordinary diligence. Id. 
Brickey contradicts defendant's argument. As defendant 
conceded below, the standard he advocates applies in the context 
of a motion for new trial (R. 306-307). However, Brickey 
recognized that a preliminary hearing, unlike a trial, does not 
amount to "a full-blown determination of an accused's guilt or 
innocence," and that, at the preliminary hearing, the State need 
only present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that 
defendant committed the charged crime. State v. Brickey, 714 
P.2d at 646. Furthermore, if it innocently fails to present 
enough of its case, that failure does not preclude refiling the 
charges. State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5 (dicta); State v. 
Rivera, 871 P.2d at 1026 n.4 (dicta). 
Brickey only prohibits the State from refiling charges on 
bindover if the State had presented it at the 1995 preliminary 
hearing (R. 359-61). In any event, Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony, 
under any definition, was "new evidence" because it did not exist 
at the time of the 1995 preliminary hearing. 
However, even if this Court disagrees that the magistrate 
determined that the State had "new evidence" within the meaning 
of Brickey, this Court may nevertheless affirm on that basis. 
See, e.g., State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996) (the 
appellate courts may affirm the outcome in the trial court on any 
legitimate basis). 
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the same evidence or on the basis of evidence that the State 
improperly held back for reasons other than an innocent 
miscalculation of the necessary quantum. Therefore, "new 
evidence" within the meaning of Brickey means nothing more than 
evidence additional to that presented at the original preliminary 
hearing that the State did not hold back for some bad faith 
purpose such as improperly hiding evidence from defendant.10 
Under this criteria, Ms. Fisk's testimony and Dr. Walker's 
opinion testimony constitute "new evidence." The evidence is 
additional to that presented to the same magistrate that 
previously dismissed the information (Tr. July 18, 1995). The 
State did not hold back the additional evidence for some 
unacceptable purpose (R. 360-61). The proffer of this new 
evidence justifies allowing the State to reprosecute defendant 
for shaking D.S. 
In sum, the magistrate correctly interpreted "good cause" to 
refile a previously dismissed charge to include a prosecutor's 
innocent underestimation at the first preliminary hearing of the 
10The procedural exigencies of a preliminary hearing also 
support this definition of "new evidence." Generally, a 
preliminary hearing must be held within ten days after charging 
for an incarcerated defendant, and within thirty days after 
charging for a defendant who it not incarcerated. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 7(g)(2). This is often insufficient time for the State to 
complete its entire investigation; the courts have implicitly 
recognized this by not requiring the State to present its entire 
case at the preliminary hearing. If, as in this case, the pre-
preliminary hearing investigation fails to provide sufficient 
evidence for a bindover, the State should have the opportunity to 
refile the charges if further investigation reveals additional 
evidence. Any other rule would be unworkable under the short 
period. 
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evidence necessary to establish probable cause.11 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS APPELLATE CLAIM THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORIGINAL 
PROSECUTOR ACTED IN GOOD FAITH BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO PRESENT THAT CLAIM TO THE MAGISTRATE 
Defendant also contends that the magistrate had no 
evidentiary basis for finding that the original prosecutor acted 
in good faith in presenting the State's case at the first 
preliminary hearing. Defendant waived this argument because he 
never made it to the magistrate. 
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the State 
had not satisfied the Brickey prerequisites to refiling the 
charges against him because the State's additional evidence did 
not constitute "new evidence" (R. 99-111). In the course of that 
argument, defendant contended that the prosecutor's failure to 
introduce that evidence "indicate[d] that the State misunderstood 
the best factual way to isolate when the brain injury occurred in 
relationship to the retinal hemorrhaging, subdermal hematomas, 
and separating of the sutures" (R. 106). Defendant also argued 
that the State "may have misunderstood the significance of D.S.'s 
ability to eat oatmeal, but this is not tantamount to these facts 
being new or previously unavailable to the State" (R. 108). 
uDefendant also argues that the State's right to appeal 
creates an alternative to refiling. To the extent that defendant 
implies that the State's right to appeal precludes refiling, the 
case law does not support his argument. State v. Jaeger, 886 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1994) anticipates that the State will refile if it 
can satisfy the Brickey standard. Id. at 54 ("a decision not to 
bind over but rather to dismiss brings the case to an abrupt end 
if the strict requirements of Brickey cannot be surmounted"). 
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Defendant attributed no nefarious motive to the prosecutor's 
failure; to the contrary, he accepted that her misunderstanding 
of the evidence led to the failure. 
The State countered that defendant's argument described 
nothing more than a prosecutor who had innocently miscalculated 
the evidence (R. 270). The State argued, both in its memorandum 
and at the oral argument, that the good faith prosecutor's good 
faith constituted "other good cause" to permit refiling the 
charges (R. 270-72, 392). 
Defendant responded to this argument only by arguing that 
the prosecutor's good faith was insufficient as a matter of law 
to satisfy the "other good cause" requirement (R. 309-10, 388-
89). However, defendant never argued alternatively that the 
prosecutor acted in bad faith or that the State had failed to 
prove that she acted in good faith. Even when the magistrate 
agreed in open court with the State's representation that the 
original prosecutor acted in good faith, defendant made no 
objection to the soundness of that conclusion. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues in the 
alternative that the magistrate's conclusion that the prosecutor 
acted in good faith is unsound. Defendant could have made this 
argument to the magistrate, but chose not to. Defendant cannot 
seek reversal of the trial court on the basis of an argument that 
he did not make to the magistrate. See, e.g., State v. Bywater, 
748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (where Bywater accepted without 
challenge the trial court's reasons for imposing the sentence 
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that it imposed on him, he could not challenge the sufficiency of 
the findings to support that sentence); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 70 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts will not consider 
arguments raised for first time on appeal). 
Alternatively, the record rebuts defendant's argument that 
the magistrate clearly erred in finding that the original 
prosecutor acted in good faith. First, the State proffered that 
the prosecutor had acted in good faith, and the magistrate agreed 
with that proffer (R. 270, 3 92). Defendant never suggested that 
the proffer was insufficient. To the contrary, defendant 
implicitly accepted the State's premise that the original 
prosecutor innocently underestimated the evidence by arguing that 
she misunderstood it. The magistrate could legitimately conclude 
that defendant did not dispute the original prosecutor's good 
faith. 
Second, the magistrate did not need an additional 
evidentiary basis for his finding that the prosecutor acted in 
good faith at the preliminary hearing. The same magistrate who 
made that finding presided over the preliminary hearing. He had 
already observed the prosecutor's efforts to obtain a bindover 
and did not need additional testimony from the prosecutor about 
her motives. 
Moreover, the Statement of Facts establishes that the 
original prosecutor presented the State's case in good faith 
under the circumstances known to the prosecutor at that time. 
The medical evidence established a series of injuries of varying 
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ages. The investigative reports gave conflicting accounts of 
defendant's activities during the critical period. Indeed, those 
reports obscure the critical timing of defendant's exclusive 
control over D.S. (R. 125, 127, 131, 137-38). 
Given these conflicting accounts and the evidence of 
multiple injuries, the magistrate did not clearly err by finding 
that the original prosecutor acted in good faith when she 
underestimated the importance of proving defendant's exclusive 
control over D.S. during a period that the investigative reports 
had not yet clearly identified. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994) (questions of fact reviewed for clear error only). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the State asks this Court to 
affirm the magistrate's order denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss. 
ft 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-5.109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age or less. 
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which 
impairs the physical condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare 
and which is not a serious physical iiyury as defined in this section. 
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries 
which seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical 
torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, 
whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to 
impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those 
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the 
same person, either at the same time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional 
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impair-
ment of the child's ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or 
organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if 
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or 
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having 
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the 
second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misde-
meanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical iiyury or, having the care 
or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misde-
meanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misde-
meanor. 
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted in the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed, where the 
existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the 
defendant resides. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds* Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
?A??ie.S -J ?Ttte? stipulation The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entiy of the judgment 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magis-
trate for setting of bail. Kan information has not been filed, one shall be filed 
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c) CI If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
cox: ~ Jtted the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be re-
turnee ic the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken 
before the proper magistrate under these rules. 
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for 
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to 
forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, 
and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person 
was arrested, is held, or is present. 
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the pro-
ceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which 
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue 
in that county. 
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misde. 
meanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as •£ 
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken 
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county of aST 
rest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released o^  
bail or held without bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate* 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy^  
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor^  
mation and how to obtain them; 
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that 
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defen-
dant in a court of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph 
(d) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any 
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(0 If the charge agaiiust the defendant ia a taisdemeaaat, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magis-
trate as provided by law. 
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not 
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these 
rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant may not be 
called on to enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the 
initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the 
right to. a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney con-
sents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in 
the district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days 
if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by 
the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not 
be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(hi W A. preliminary exaxainatiori ehall be held u&der the r\alee aad lawe 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden 
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, 
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defen-
dant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
gtate from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
o-rty, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
£ot to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistr - x may order all spectators 
•a be excluded from the courtroom, 
(j) (1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records 
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, record-
ings, and any typewritten transcript. 
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sher-
iff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order, 
(k) (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is re-
quired, the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a 
sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness 
complies or is otherwise legally discharged. 
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be 
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the wit-
ness. 
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May 1, 199? 
MR. CRAIG BARLOW 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
236 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CiTY, UT 84114 
Dear Mr, Borlow: 
Re; Daniel Alex Shepherd 
As per your request. I have reviewed the medical records regordlng Daniel 
Shepherd. Briefly summarized. Donle! was o two year old mole who was 
brought to the Emergency Room at Primary Children's Medical Center on 
March 19. 1995 comatose from a severe head injury. As you ore aware. the'e 
is a pre-existing CT scan from March 3, 1995 which does not show any 
evidence of brain damage. At the time he wos admitted to PCMC on 
March 19.1995 he hod fresh Weeding over the surface of his brain and retinal 
hemorrhages $eer\ in his eye grounds. This combination of Injuries li highly 
indicative of a shaking injury. 
Information from Daniel's caregivers indicates that in the morning of March 19. 
1995 he was noted to be awoke, alert and was eating. He was noted to be 
fussy but more was no other evlaence ot Illness. At approximately 4:00pm on 
March 19. 1995 his father came from a closed room with Daniel In hfs arms ond 
Daniel was cyanotic and not breathing. He wos brought to P C M C Emergency 
Room in this condition. 
The fact that Daniel was able to be awoke, alert and eating on the morning 
of March 19. 1995 Jndlcotes that he had not yet sustained a massive brain 
injury That is to say after the injury occurred this chifd would not have te^n 
able to be awake or conscious. The fgct thaf he was noted to be awake and 
responsive earner simpiy means the injury had not yet occurred. Based on the 
Information available to me. Daniel's massive brain Injury occurred after he 
was seen eating and fussing ond within hours to minutes of his cyanotic and 
opnec condition at opproxtmotely 4:00pm. 
Daniel has no other medical illness and no other injuries which would explain 
deterioration from a pre-existing condition. Even if he had prior Uouma to his 
head It would not explain the magnitude of Injury that was seen at the time 
of his admission to the hospital. His follow up MRl study November 1995 shows 
significant loss of brain substance (brain atrophy) secondary to the global Injury 
lhat he sustained to his brain on March 19. 1995. 
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May 1. 1997 
Re. Daniel Alex Shepherd 
Page Two 
It is very unlikely ond almost impossfDie for the Injuries observed on the March 
21, 1995 CT scan and November 1995 MRI study to hove been sustained by 
any other mechanism other thon shoking ond boshing. The nature of the 
retinal hemorrhages ond the location of the bleeding within and on the 
surface of his brain Is so highly consistent with shaking injury thot there is 
essentioHy no other explanation. 
I nope this Information is helpful, Please fet me know jf I can provide any 
further information to you. 
Sincerely yours, 
A/f'AU &<£) 
Marion l. Walker. M.D.. F.A.C.S.. F.A.A.P. 
Professor and Head 
Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery 
University of Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Page 1 
4 THE STATE OF UTAH, 
5 Plaintiff, 
6 -vs-
7 MICHAEL & MELISSA FISK, 
8 Defendant* . 
ORIe O MA I Vih\L 
Case No. 971001743 FS 
BENCH DECISION, 6-30-97 
10 
11 BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day 
12 of June, 1997, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came 
13 on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD, 
14 District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake 
15 County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
16 
17 A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the S t a t e : 












Attorney at Law 
^ftiOSHSTHieTCMJRT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 0 1 1997 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is a troubling case. 
3 And while this isnft addressed in Brickey, it 
4 probably isn't relevant for me to even consider it. 
5 And at this point and stage, it appears that Mr. Fisk 
6 has committed a serious crime, and that's something 
7 that you have to know weighs on any judge that's 
8 looking at a situation like this as the Brickey 
9 analysis goes forward. I 
10 There is no question in my mind but that 
11 the facts existed and were discoverable upon which 
12 this case could have been bound over after the 
13 original preliminary hearing. At the same time, I 
14 don't see any bad faith on the part of the State 
15 whatsoever. 
16 What I come down to is a combination of 
17 things: One is, I don't think what the opinion 
18 writer in Brickey meant when the word "unavailable" 
19 was used is what we would normally think of as 
20 "unavailable" would mean. And as a straight matter 
21 of definition, "unavailable" would mean that the 
22 evidence couldn't have been ferreted out. I think it 
23 could have. I think what they mean is what should 
24 the State have known, what ought the State have 
25 known? 
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1 Clearly, the State at the time of 
2 preliminary hearing, didn't have Dr. Walkers' 
3 opinion. And for whatever reason - and I think we 
4 are talking about competence here, frankly — the 
5 State didn't seem to know about the facts limiting 
6 the period of the injury from the eating of the 
7 oatmeal for a short period of time after that and 
8 Mr. Fisk's proximity to the child during that time 
9 period. In criminal cases, there are appeals raised 
10 on ineffectiveness of counsel for the Defendant. I 
11 think probably what we have here is ineffective 
12 counsel for the State. And I think that amounts to 
13 newly discovered evidence on the part of Dr. Walker 
14 and/or its cause to a limited extent. 
15 I am going to allow this case to go 
16 forward on Count I in the Information against 
17 Mr. Fisk, only. I think all the rest of it is 
18 precluded by the ruling that was made in the original 
19 preliminary hearing. 
20 So that's my ruling. 
21 MR. BARLOW: For clarification, Your 
22 Honor: Do we then have a bindover or do we -
23 MR. BUGDEN: Well, there can't be a 
24 bindover from that. 
25 THE COURT: You have to have another 
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1 preliminary hearing. 
2 MR. BARLOW: Okay, that's just what I 
3 was ~ 
4 THE COURT: And I'm not sure whether that 
5 should be in front of me at this stage or not. 
6 Clearly, this hearing had to be in front of me. And 
7 I don't know. The case was filed in Murray; wasn't 
8 it? 
9 MR. BUGDEN: I don't know. 
10 MR. BRASS: It got sent to Murray, excuse 
11 me, the way it works — 
12 THE COURT: It was spun out. 
13 MR. BRASS: -geographical. 
14 THE COURT: What do you think, 
15 Mr. Barlow, where should we schedule it? 
16 MR. BARLOW: Well, I'm certainly 
17 comfortable having it in front of you, Your Honor. I 
18 don't know that there is - 1 guess I am concerned 
19 that we not have a legal issue about whether you 
20 should hear it or some other judge should hear it. 
21 THE COURT: What's the Defense 
22 perspective? What is fairer to Mr. Fisk, to have 
23 another hearing in front of me when all this has 
24 already gone on or to have a fresh face? 
25 MR. BARLOW: I think that is a fair way 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: CaseNo.97|01742FS 
Judge Stephen Henrpid 
A hearing on this case was held June 30,1997. Michael Fisk was present and represented 
by Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; Melissa Fisk was present and represented by Edward K. Brass; the 
State was represented by Craig L. Barlow, Assistant Attorney General. This case was originally 
filed as a one-count information against both Defendants charging child abuse, a second-degree 
felony and alleging that on or about between March 1,1995, and March 19,1995, the 
Defendants, having the care and custody of Daniel Shepherd, intentionally or knowingly caused 
or permitted another to inflict serious physical injury upon said child. The preliminary hearing 
was held July 18,1995. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court ruled that the 
injuries to the victim were non-accidental but that there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the defendants caused the injury and dismissed the information. At the July 18,1995 preliminary 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
MICHAEL JAMES FISK, III 
MELISSA FISK, 
Defendants. 
hearing, the State was represented by the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. In 1997, the State 
of Utah, through the Utah Attorney General's Office filed a second information against these 
Defendants charging various crimes of child abuse during the same time as was alleged in the 
first information. An initial hearing was held May 5,1997, to determine if the case warranted 
further examination by the Court under State v. Brickev. 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah, 1986). The 
parties have submitted memoranda addressing the filing of new charges. The Court has 
considered these memoranda and heard arguments from Counsel. Based on the memoranda, the 
arguments of Counsel, the Court's independent review of the record, and the Court's familiarity 
with the case, because of the first preliminary hearing, the Court enters the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There is probable cause to believe that a child, Daniel Shepherd, was injured by non-
accidental trauma on or about March 19, 1995. 
2. Information about the injuries to the child, the timing of the injuries, and the 
exclusivity of control of Michael Fisk over the child when the injury likely occurred was 
available to the State before the preliminary hearing in July, 1995. 
3. The evidence presented by the State at the July 18,1995, preliminary hearing was 
not sufficient to show probable cause that the injuries were committed by one of the Defendants. 
4. Information, by way of proffer, has now been presented to the Court which indicates, 
2 
with more precision than was offered at the preliminary hearing, the timing of the injuries to 
the victim and the exclusivity of control over the victim by Michael Fisk during the period of 
time when the injuries most likely occurred. 
5. Presentation of the evidence by the State at the July 18,1995, was done in good 
faith. However, the Court finds that the prosecutor failed to discover facts which through the 
exercise of ordinary diligence could have been discovered; failed to present critical evidence 
which could have established when the injury was inflicted and by whom the injury was 
inflicted. 
6. The Court further finds that the facts existed and were discoverable through ordinary 
diligence upon which this case could have been bound-over after the original preliminary 
hearing. However, the failure to discover the evidence and the failure to present more 
compelling evidence regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of control over the 
victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good faith. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following conclusions of 
law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State failed to present sufficient evidence at the July 18,1995, preliminary 
hearing to show probable cause that the injury to the victim was caused by Michael Fisk. 
2. The failure to present sufficient evidence of probable cause regarding who 
3 
committed the crime was not done in bad faith, maliciously, or with an intent to mislead the 
Court or defense counsel. Rather, it appears and the court concludes that facts which existed at 
the time of the first preliminary hearing were discoverable in the exercise of ordinary diligence, 
but were not presented as evidence at the first preliminary 
3. The testimony of Dr. Marion Walker may amount to newly discovered evidence or 
good cause. 
4. The State's good faith failure to present discoverable evidence showing more precise 
timing of the victim's injuries and the exclusivity of control of the victim by Michael Fisk 
together with the State's current proffer regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of 
control by the defendant over the victim constitutes "other good cause" as discussed in State v. 
Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986). 
5. The Court concludes that Count 1 of the second information charging Michael Fisk 
with child abuse, a second degree felony, may be presented to a magistrate consistent with State 
v. Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986) to determine if that charge should be bound over for trial. 
6. The additional charges of the second information, that is, Counts 2, 3,4, and 5 
encompass the same period of time as was charged in the first information. These additional 
charges could have been separated when the first information was filed and therefore, filing them 
as separate charges is prohibited by the doctrine of single criminal episode.. 
7. Counts 2, 3,4, and 5 are dismissed and the State is barred from refiling them, absent 
4 
an appeal by the State and reversal of this decision by the Court of Appeals. 
8. The Defendant Michael Fisk, through his counsel, may elect to have evidence in 
support of count 1 of the second information presented before this Judge or may choose to have 
another magistrate hear the additional evidence. If the Defendant elects to have another judge or 
this Judge hear additional evidence regarding count 1, the Defendant must make that election on 
the record and the Court will make a minute entry stating the election in light of State v. Brickey. 
9. This case appears to be a matter of first impression in its application of State v. 
Brickey. The interests of justice and judicial economy will be served if this matter is reviewed 
by interlocutory appeal. The Court concludes that no prejudice to either the State or the 
defendant Michael Fisk will occur if an appeal is taken to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 3 ^ ~ day of July, 1997. _ 
Judge Stephen Henrted 
Approved as to form: 
Craig L. BOTOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
Attorney for Michael Fisk 
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